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THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE “EFFECT”: HOW
THE DIFFICULTY IN RECONCILING EXXON AND HUNT
HAS LED TO A CIRCUIT SPLIT FOR CHALLENGES TO
LAWS AFFECTING NATIONAL CHAINS
Valerie Walker*
Abstract: The onslaught of chains such as Wal-Mart and Starbucks has driven some state
and local lawmakers to craft regulations prohibiting these types of national chains. In
response, several national chains have challenged the constitutionality of such regulations,
claiming that they amount to economic protectionism. The dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC) doctrine prohibits states from engaging in protectionism directed at commerce from
other states. Courts use a two-tiered analysis when considering these types of challenges. The
tier-level analysis is important because regulations rarely survive the first tier’s elevated
scrutiny. The first tier applies when a state law directly discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over out-of-state interests.
The Supreme Court reached inconsistent decisions as to whether a regulation has a
discriminatory effect, as demonstrated by a careful analysis of Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Commission and Exxon Corporation v. Governor of Maryland. These two
decisions are difficult to reconcile: Hunt supports a finding of discriminatory effect where a
regulation stripped an out-of-state entity of a competitive advantage it secured through its
particular business practice, but Exxon indicates that the DCC does not protect particular
structures or methods of business. This inconsistency has contributed to a split between
courts in the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. While courts in the First and Ninth Circuits
have found that prohibitions affecting chain stores do not produce a discriminatory effect, the
Eleventh Circuit has come to the opposite conclusion. This circuit split tracks the tension
between Hunt and Exxon. Potential solutions to this split include eliminating the first tier
elevated scrutiny analysis, creating a special exception for national chains, or otherwise
clarifying the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding discriminatory effect.

INTRODUCTION
Whether individuals live in places with small town charm, or in urban
neighborhoods with distinct personalities, they have probably heard
friends and neighbors opine on the subject of national chains. Some
people loathe the entry of cookie-cutter franchises that hurt local
business, while others are eager to take advantage of businesses with a
national reputation. In response to concerns about the negative effects of
national chains, some municipalities have sought to prohibit, or
otherwise disadvantage, chain businesses. 1 Some businesses have
* With thanks to Professor Lisa Manheim for her feedback, in addition to the dedicated staff of
Washington Law Review.
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challenged these regulations under the dormant Commerce Clause
(DCC). 2
The DCC prohibits states from engaging in protectionism directed at
commerce from other states. 3 Courts engage in a two-tiered analysis
when considering challenges based on the DCC. 4 This Note focuses on
the first tier of the analysis; in this tier, the court must apply elevated
scrutiny when a state law “directly regulates or discriminates against
interstate commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic
interests over out-of-state interests.” 5
When determining whether a state law has discriminatory effect, the
Supreme Court has held that the DCC does not protect “the particular
structure or methods of operation in a retail market.” 6 However, the
Supreme Court has also held that a law produced a discriminatory effect
when it “stripp[ed]” an out-of-state producer “of the competitive and
economic advantages it ha[d] earned for itself,” while the law left instate producers unaffected. 7 These two decisions are difficult to
reconcile in the context of state laws affecting national chains, and this
has contributed to a split between the approaches of the First, Ninth, and
Eleventh Circuits. 8
On one side of the split, 9 courts in the Eleventh Circuit, relying upon
Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, 10 applied
elevated scrutiny to state laws with size-based and chain-based
prohibitions. 11 On the other side of the split, courts in the Ninth Circuit,

1. Mark Bobrowski, The Regulation of Formula Businesses and the Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 44 URB. LAW. 227, 227 (2012).
2. See, e.g., Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015)
(challenging a regulation treating franchises as large businesses such that they faced a faster phasein of the new minimum wage); Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008) (challenging a
regulation prohibiting formula restaurants).
3. See DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 209–10 (2004).
4. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986).
5. Id. at 579.
6. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 127 (1978).
7. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 351 (1977).
8. Infra section I.C; Part II.
9. The Ninth Circuit noted this split in a footnote in Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle,
803 F.3d 389, 404 n.7 (9th Cir. 2015).
10. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
11. Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2008) (scrutinizing a size-based
regulation); Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2008)
(scrutinizing a regulation pertaining to “formula retail” establishments, including national chain
stores).
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relying upon Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 12 chose not to apply
elevated scrutiny to laws affecting national chains, such as prohibitions
on retailers wishing to build large establishments, 13 or laws subjecting
franchisees to a steeper schedule of wage increases. 14 As for the First
Circuit, it also chose not to apply elevated scrutiny to laws affecting
national chains. 15 The inconsistencies of Exxon and Hunt best explain
the tension between these circuit decisions.
This Note examines why the circuits have split over the purported
discriminatory effect of laws regulating national chains. Part I explores
the background of the DCC, including the Supreme Court’s two-tiered
approach to analyzing these kinds of challenges and how the Supreme
Court approached the first-tier inquiry in Hunt and Exxon. Part II covers
the different circuit approaches to the first tier inquiry. Part III explains
how these circuit approaches derive from the disconnect between Hunt
and Exxon and then explores how best to remedy the circuit split.
Overall these three parts work together to explain what is driving the
circuit split and how the Supreme Court might clarify this muddled area
of the law.
I.

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE DOCTRINE
OPERATES IN TWO TIERS, AND THE FIRST TIER IS MIRED
IN CONFUSION

A.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine Is an Implied Restraint
that Courts Have Read into the Constitution

The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution gives
Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.” 16 While the
Commerce Clause serves as a grant of federal legislative power, it has
also been read to serve as a limit to state legislative power.17 The term
“dormant Commerce Clause” (DCC) refers to the limiting principles
implied from the Commerce Clause. 18 The Court has extrapolated the
12. 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
13. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 991–92 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
14. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 397 (9th Cir. 2015).
15. Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 15 (1st Cir. 2007) (concluding that
there was insufficient evidence of discriminatory effect).
16. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
17. See COENEN, supra note 3, at 209–10.
18. Id. Scholars and practitioners refer to the clause as “dormant,” or “negative,” because the
principle has been inferred from the text of the Commerce Clause. See James L. Buchwalter,
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DCC from the text of the Commerce Clause under the premise that “the
centralization of commercial regulatory authority in Congress implied
judicially enforceable restraints on the states’ regulation of interstate
commerce.” 19 As a result of this implied restraint, courts may invalidate
state legislation even though “Congress has not affirmatively exercised
its commerce power to preempt that legislation.” 20
The Court has used the DCC to invalidate state laws that
“‘discriminate against’ or impose an ‘undue burden’ on interstate
commerce.” 21 A classic example of a DCC violation is where a state has
imposed tariffs on goods imported into that state from other states.22
DCC violations are less clear, however, when states regulate in facially
neutral ways. 23
The Commerce Clause applies not only to states but also to the
actions of municipalities. 24 Over the last twenty years, a “cadre” of
municipalities attempted to restrict “formula” businesses.25 There could
be a variety of different motives driving these restrictions. Some
municipalities may be concerned that formula businesses will threaten
local “mom and pop” establishments 26 or that these new businesses will
Annotation, Construction and Application of Dormant Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl.
3, in 41 A.L.R. FED. 2D 1, § 2 (2009). For an argument that the dormant Commerce Clause should
be abandoned, given its lack of textual foundation, see MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS
POLITICAL STRUCTURE 64 (1995). Alternatively, for an explanation of the values driving this
doctrine, see COENEN, supra note 3, at 211–14.
19. Brannon P. Denning, Reconstructing the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 417, 421 (2008).
20. COENEN, supra note 3, at 209.
21. Id. at 210 (citations omitted); see also ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 430 (4th ed. 2011) (defining the DCC as “the principle that state and
local laws are unconstitutional if they place an undue burden on interstate commerce”); REDISH,
supra note 18, at 67 (“[T]he Court, relying on the clause, has invalidated state licensing
requirements, train length restrictions, mudguard requirements, truck length prohibitions, and
various produce regulations.”).
22. COENEN, supra note 3, at 210.
23. See id. at 239 (describing facially neutral laws as “ill-defined” and referring to “the contours
of this feature of dormant Commerce Clause doctrine” as “under-developed”). For example,
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935) involved a state program that “stipulated that
dealers who bought milk from out-of-state producers for resale in New York could not pay them
less than the statutorily specified minimum amount.” Id. at 232. Although the Court recognized that
the minimum price rule applied uniformly to all milk, whether from in-state or out-of-state, the
Court reasoned that this program deprived out-of-state sellers the opportunity to undersell in-state
competitors and thus “set up what is equivalent to a rampart of customs duties.” Baldwin, 294 U.S.
at 527.
24. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
25. Bobrowski, supra note 1, at 227.
26. Id.
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eliminate any “sense of place.” 27 Municipalities relying upon tourism to
support their local economy might be especially concerned about being
reduced into “just another nondescript roadside stop in a nation of strip
malls.” 28 While these municipalities may have legitimate concerns, the
DCC serves as a barrier to municipalities engaging in economic
protectionism. 29
B.

The Dormant Commerce Clause Has Two Tiers

When analyzing DCC claims, the Court uses a “two-tiered
approach.” 30 The Court frames the first tier in the following way: “When
a state statute directly regulates or discriminates against interstate
commerce, or when its effect is to favor in-state economic interests over
out-of-state interests, we have generally struck down the statute without
further inquiry.” 31 When state action does discriminate against interstate
commerce, it is subject to a virtual per se rule of invalidity.32
Invalidation of the law is likely, though not inevitable. 33 Courts
sometimes refer to this first tier as “elevated scrutiny.” 34 Under this first
tier analysis, if plaintiffs have met their initial burden of proving
discrimination, the government can justify the discrimination by
showing the following three things: “(1) the regulations have a
legitimate local purpose; (2) the regulations serve this legitimate interest;
and (3) adequate nondiscriminatory alternatives are not available.” 35

27. Id. at 230.
28. Id.
29. See COENEN, supra note 3, at 209–210 (discussing the DCC as a barrier to states). As
previously mentioned, the DCC also limits the actions of municipalities. Supra note 24 and
accompanying text.
30. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 578–79 (1986); see
also Bobrowski, supra note 1, at 244.
31. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.
32. John M. Baker & Mehmet K. Konar-Steenberg, “Drawn from Local Knowledge . . . And
Conformed to Local Wants”: Zoning and Incremental Reform of Dormant Commerce Clause
Doctrine, 38 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 5 (2006).
33. See, e.g., Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 150 (1986) (upholding a statute that discriminated
against interstate commerce).
34. See, e.g., Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2008).
35. BRIAN W. BLAESSER, DISCRETIONARY LAND USE CONTROLS § 8:71, Westlaw (database
updated Aug. 2016) (citing Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979); Hunt v. Wash. State
Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977)).
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Consequently, governments rarely overcome this heightened, first tier
scrutiny. 36
As for the second tier, 37 commonly referred to as the “Pike balancing”
test, 38 the Court frames it in the following way: “When . . . a statute has
only indirect effects on interstate commerce and regulates evenhandedly,
we have examined whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether
the burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.” 39
Because this second tier of analysis is more deferential, 40 courts are
more likely to uphold regulations falling under this category. While
courts applying the second tier are unlikely to invalidate a particular
regulation, some scholars have noted that it can be difficult to determine
which tier applies in a given situation. 41
This Note focuses on the first tier because its application frequently
results in the invalidation of laws. 42 The application of the first tier thus
has a dramatic effect on likely case outcomes. 43 The factor that drives
the distinction between the first and second tier inquiry is whether the
particular state regulatory scheme constitutes “discrimination.”44
Discrimination means “differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state
economic interests that benefits the former and burdens the latter.” 45

36. Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 8 (commenting that the strict scrutiny of this tier
of the DCC analysis involves “almost per se invalidation” of laws).
37. For a more in-depth understanding of how the second tier has developed, see Catherine Gage
O’Grady, Targeting State Protectionism Instead of Interstate Discrimination Under the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 571, 610–22 (1997).
38. Denning, supra note 19, at 417–18.
39. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
40. Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 5.
41. See, e.g., Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 6 (“[I]t is unclear where discrimination
leaves off and incidental burdens begin.”).
42. See COENEN, supra note 3, at 224. (“In sum, in the dormant Commerce Clause context,
judicial scrutiny that is ‘“strict” in theory’ is, for all practical purposes, ‘fatal in fact.’”); O’Grady,
supra note 37, at 573–74 (“[T]he court asks whether the ordinance in question ‘discriminates’
against interstate commerce. If the answer is yes, the court will apply the strictest scrutiny to the
ordinance under a near-fatal rule of ‘virtual per se’ invalidity.”).
43. O’Grady, supra note 37, at 574 (“Thus, a court’s threshold determination on the question of
interstate discrimination dictates the standard under which the court will review the local regulation.
It is essentially an outcome-determinative finding.”).
44. David S. Day, The “Mature” Rehnquist Court and the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine:
The Expanded Discrimination Tier, 52 S.D. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007).
45. O’Grady, supra note 37, at 578 (quoting Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 98, 99 (1994)).
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Courts have characterized three kinds of discrimination: facial
discrimination, discriminatory purpose, and discriminatory effect. 46
Facial discrimination might appear in a state statute that prohibits all
businesses from selling out-of-state oranges in that state and permits
them to sell only in-state oranges, thereby resulting in differential
treatment. 47 Another example of facial discrimination might be where a
state statute allows TV advertising of in-state oranges, but prohibits TV
advertising of out-of-state oranges. 48 With respect to discriminatory
purpose, that might exist where there is direct evidence of government
officials commenting on a protectionist agenda underlying a facially
neutral law. 49 Regulations that do not qualify as facially discriminatory
or as having a discriminatory purpose may still qualify as discriminatory
in terms of effect.
This Note analyzes discriminatory effect (as opposed to facial
discrimination or discriminatory purpose) because it is the source of a
circuit split between the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits: courts in
these circuits have come to different conclusions about DCC challenges
to laws affecting national chains. 50
DCC cases dealing with the concept of discriminatory effect “are
particularly troublesome,” and they present a challenge for courts
attempting to base their judgments on principled reasoning. 51 Because
discrimination demarcates the line between the first and second tiers,
and discriminatory effect may serve as a claim of last resort by plaintiffs,
the concept of discriminatory effect is important for determining the
boundary between tiers one and two. While this two-tiered framework
may seem organized, interpretive problems have resulted in confusion
over which tier should apply in a given case. 52 The Court has

46. Id. at 578; COENEN, supra note 3, at 224. Some scholars point out the amorphous distinction
between discriminatory purpose and effect. See, e.g., Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at
24.
47. See O’Grady, supra note 37, at 579 (providing an example about regulating fresh produce).
48. Id.
49. See Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 403 (9th Cir. 2015) (indicating
that the evidence was too “indirect and limited,” and was not persuasive evidence of the City’s
intent to harm franchises).
50. Id. at 404 n.7.
51. Denning, supra note 19, at 464; see also COENEN, supra note 3, at 239 (explaining how the
contours of discriminatory effect remain “under-developed”); Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note
32, at 3 (“[T]he ‘discriminatory effects’ prong . . . has resulted in considerable doctrinal
ambiguity.”).
52. Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 6; see also Denning, supra note 19, at 422
(“These rules are easy to recite, but their application is notoriously difficult, resulting in cases with
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acknowledged that no “clear line” separates the two tiers, and the
murkiness of the discriminatory effect jurisprudence has contributed to
this blurring of the tiers. 53
C.

First Tier Turmoil: The Tests for Elevated Scrutiny in Hunt and
Exxon Demonstrate a Tension Between These Two Cases

There are two Supreme Court cases in particular that serve as an
example of where it is “particularly troublesome . . . to extrapolate
principles” concerning what constitutes a discriminatory effect. 54 In the
first case, Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission, the
Court held that a state law produced a discriminatory effect,55 but a year
later, the Court came to the opposite conclusion in Exxon Corporation v.
Governor of Maryland, a case with analogous facts. The tension existing
between these two cases illustrates the analytical difficulty in this area of
the law and, as discussed below, has produced a split among the circuits.
1.

Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commission
Illustrates the Supreme Court’s More Aggressive Interpretation of
Elevated Scrutiny

Hunt involved a challenge to a North Carolina statute that prohibited
the use of grading systems other than U.S. grade on closed containers of
apples sold in the state. 56 That statute did not affect North Carolina apple
sellers because North Carolina had no grading system in place. 57 The
statute did, however, affect Washington apple sellers.58 They challenged
the statute because it prohibited them from using a Washington state
grading system for apples sold in North Carolina. 59 In order for
Washington sellers to comply with the statute, they could choose one of
the following options: obliterate the printed labels on containers shipped
to North Carolina, repack apples to be shipped to North Carolina in

similar facts being decided differently, and the different outcomes justified on the basis of
tendentious distinctions.”).
53. Justin Shoemake, Note, The Smalling of America?: Growth Management Statutes and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 48 DUKE L. J. 891, 913 (1999).
54. Denning, supra note 19, at 464; see also Shoemake, supra note 53, at 926.
55. 432 U.S. 333 (1977).
56. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 336 (1977).
57. See id. at 340.
58. Id. at 337.
59. Id. The Washington State grades are the equivalent of, or superior to, the U.S. grades. Id. at
336.
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containers with the U.S. grade, or discontinue the use of preprinted
containers entirely. 60
The Court concluded that this statute had the practical effect of
discriminating against sales of Washington apples, and it pointed to
three ways in which this discrimination arose. 61 First, the statute raised
“the costs of doing business in the North Carolina market for
Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their
North Carolina counterparts unaffected.” 62 Second, the statute had the
effect of “stripping away from the Washington apple industry the
competitive and economic advantages it has earned for itself through its
expensive inspection and grading system.” 63 Third, the statute had “a
leveling effect which insidiously operate[d] to the advantage of local
apple producers.” 64
Because this statute discriminated against commerce, elevated
scrutiny applied, and “the burden f[ell] on the State to justify [the
statute] both in terms of the local benefits flowing from the statute and
the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve
the local interests at stake.” 65 North Carolina tried to justify the statute
on the grounds that it protected their citizens from confusion and
deception in the marketing of foodstuffs. 66 However, the Court struck
down the statute because it did very little to serve that state interest,67
and nondiscriminatory alternatives were available. 68

60. Id. at 338.
61. Id. at 350.
62. Id. at 351.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 353.
66. Id.
67. The Court stated:
The statute, as already noted, permits the marketing of closed containers of apples under no
grades at all. Such a result can hardly be thought to eliminate the problems of deception and
confusion created by the multiplicity of differing state grades; indeed, it magnifies them by
depriving purchasers of all information concerning the quality of the contents of closed apple
containers. Moreover, although the statute is ostensibly a consumer protection measure, it
directs its primary efforts, not at the consuming public at large, but at apple wholesalers and
brokers who are the principal purchasers of closed containers of apples. And those individuals
are presumably the most knowledgeable individuals in this area. Since the statute does nothing
at all to purify the flow of information at the retail level, it does little to protect consumers
against the problems it was designed to eliminate.
Id. at 353–54.
68. Id. at 354.
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Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland Illustrates the Supreme
Court’s Less Aggressive Interpretation of Elevated Scrutiny

Exxon involved a challenge to a Maryland statute that prohibited
producers or refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service
stations in Maryland. 69 All of the gasoline sold in Maryland came from
out of state because Maryland itself had no producers or refiners.70
Therefore, the statute only affected those retail service operators that
were from out of state. 71
Exxon argued that the statute had a discriminatory effect by
protecting in-state retail gas stations from competition with gas stations
owned by out-of-state oil producers and refiners. 72 While the burden of
the statute fell exclusively on out-of-state companies, this was
insufficient support for a finding of discriminatory effect. 73 The Court
distinguished this case from cases in which the Court had found
discrimination against interstate commerce, citing Hunt and Dean Milk
Co. v. Madison 74 as examples. 75 It explained that the Exxon statute did
not create any of the following three barriers: the statute did not
“prohibit the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon them, or
distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail
market.” 76
The Court further explained that the DCC does not protect “the
particular structure or methods of operation in a retail market.” 77 The
DCC “protects the interstate market, not particular interstate firms, from
prohibitive or burdensome regulations.” 78 Because the Court concluded
that the State had a legitimate interest in controlling the gasoline retail
market and that there was no burden on interstate commerce, the statute
was upheld. 79

69. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 117 (1978).
70. Id. at 123.
71. Id. at 126.
72. Id. at 125.
73. Id.
74. 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (concerning a regulation that prohibited milk not bottled within five
miles of the area).
75. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 127.
78. Id. at 127–28.
79. See id. at 127.
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Hunt and Exxon Are Inconsistent

The three barriers that the Exxon Court identified as absent in Exxon
and present in Hunt do not divide the cases as clearly as the Court
describes. With respect to the first barrier, the flow of goods, Hunt
applied to restrictive business practices, not the actual flow of goods
themselves. 80 Hunt and Exxon both deal with facially neutral statutes
that discriminate against particular business practices, not goods from
particular states. 81
As for the second barrier, the added costs that a statute creates for outof-state dealers, the burden imposed in Exxon appears “more severe”
than that in Hunt, because the Exxon statute completely banned refiners
and producers from the retail market. 82 The Hunt statute, in contrast,
merely banned a method of grading apples, 83 a practice that a business
could more easily change than its business’s status as a refiner and
producer of petroleum products.
The third barrier that the Exxon Court contended existed in cases like
Hunt, but not in Exxon, was that the Hunt statute distinguished between
in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market.84 The argument
here is that “the discrimination against the class of out-of-state producers
and refiners does not violate the Commerce Clause because the State has
not imposed similar discrimination against other out-of-state retailers,”
and that this somehow differs from the facts of Hunt. 85 However, the
regulation in Hunt did not discriminate against all out-of-state interests;
it only discriminated against a segment of out-of-state interests, namely
those producers that failed to conform to the statute’s grade marketing

80. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 335 (1977); see also
Denning, supra note 19, at 466 (“[T]he Court had not required the Washington apple growers to
prove that North Carolina’s regulations reduced the interstate flow of apples.”); Shoemake, supra
note 53, at 926 (“The North Carolina statute at issue in [Hunt] . . . similarly did not prohibit the flow
of interstate goods or distinguish between in-state and out-of-state goods in the retail market. It, like
the measure at issue in Exxon, was a regulation of how business was done.”).
81. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 335–38 (challenging a regulation that pertains to the labeling of
apples); Exxon, 437 U.S. at 119–20 (challenging a regulation that pertains to the operations of
producers and refiners of petroleum products).
82. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 148 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 335.
84. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126.
85. Id. at 145–46 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Denning,
supra note 19, at 466 (“Some of the Court’s claims in Exxon, moreover—for example, that the
relevant comparison for the effects of the statute was between in-state and out-of-state independent
retail sellers, as opposed to all retailers of gasoline (which would include the refiner-owned gas
stations)—seem arbitrary and difficult to defend.”).
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requirements. 86 As Justice Blackmun explained in his dissenting opinion
in Exxon: “[t]he provision imposed no discrimination on growers from
States that employed only the United States Department of Agriculture
grading system.” 87 Thus, in both Hunt and Exxon, the laws worked
against a “single segment of out-of-state” business as opposed to
universal discrimination against out-of-state business. 88 Some scholars
contend that Exxon was wrongly decided because it failed to properly
distinguish Hunt. 89
II.

THE NATURE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

While courts in the Eleventh Circuit have concluded that prohibitions
affecting chain stores do produce a discriminatory effect,90 the Ninth and
First Circuits have come to the opposite conclusion. 91 As discussed
below, this circuit split tracks the tension between Hunt and Exxon.
A.

Courts in the Eleventh Circuit Privilege the Reasoning from Hunt

Two cases 92 represent the Eleventh Circuit’s approach to elevated
scrutiny in the context of laws affecting national chains: Cachia v.
Islamorada 93 and Island Silver & Spice, Inc., v. Islamorada. 94 These
cases demonstrate the Eleventh Circuit’s tendency to privilege the
reasoning from Hunt over that from Exxon.

86. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Denning, supra note 19, at 466.
87. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 146 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
88. Id. at 147. In Hunt, the segment was out-of-state dealers failing to conform to the marketing
requirements (as compared to out-of-state dealers that only used the USDA grading system), and in
Exxon, the segment was out-of-state retailers that produce and refine gasoline (as compared to outof-state retailers that do not produce or refine gasoline). See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 337; Exxon, 437 U.S.
119–20.
89. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN
QUEST FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 235, 237 (2014).
90. See Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2008); Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v.
Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2008).
91. Int’l Franchise Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 405–06 (9th Cir. 2015); Wine &
Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 12, 14 (1st Cir. 2007); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1020 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
92. These cases were consolidated for oral argument. Island Silver, 542 F.3d at 846 n.1.
93. 542 F.3d 839 (11th Cir. 2008).
94. 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008).

17 - Walker.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]
1.

12/20/2016 1:20 PM

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE “EFFECT”

1907

In Cachia v. Islamorada, the Eleventh Circuit Applied Elevated
Scrutiny to an Ordinance Prohibiting “Formula Restaurants”

Joseph Cachia owned property in Islamorada, and he wanted to sell
his property to a corporation for use as a Starbucks. 95 The Village
Council of Islamorada adopted a zoning ordinance that interfered with
Cachia’s sale. 96 The potential buyer backed out of the deal when it
learned that the ordinance prohibited it from opening a Starbucks. 97
Ordinance 02-02 prohibited “formula restaurant[s]” in Islamorada,
which the ordinance defined as:
An eating place that is one of a chain or group of three (3) or
more existing establishments and which satisfies at least two of
the following three descriptions: (1) has the same or similar
name, tradename, or trademark as others in the chain or group;
(2) offers any of the following characteristics in a style which is
distinctive to and standardized among the chain or group: i.
exterior design or architecture; ii. uniforms, except that a
personal identification or simple logo will not render the
clothing a uniform; or iii. has a standardized menu; or (3) is a
fast food restaurant.98
In justifying this ordinance, the Village Council found that formula
restaurants threatened the “unique character” of the Village. 99 Cachia
challenged the ordinance on DCC grounds. 100
Although the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida upheld Islamorada’s ordinance, 101 the Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals held that elevated scrutiny applied to the ordinance. 102 The
Eleventh Circuit explained that Cachia’s argument relied on Hunt, while
Islamorada’s argument relied on Exxon. 103 Islamorada argued that the
ordinance should not be subject to elevated scrutiny because the
ordinance only targeted a particular structure of business, not all out-ofstate businesses. 104 The Eleventh Circuit, while noting that Exxon

95. Cachia, 542 F.3d at 841.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 843 n.4; see also Bobrowski supra note 1, at 249.
100. Cachia, 542 F.3d at 841.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 840.
103. Id. at 842–43.
104. Id.
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“rejected the notion ‘that the Commerce Clause protects [a] particular
structure or methods of operation in a retail market,’” concluded that
“the ordinance’s complete prohibition of chain restaurants sharing
certain characteristics amounts to more than the regulation of methods of
operation.” 105 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit held that elevated scrutiny
applied to the ordinance. 106 The Eleventh Circuit remanded the case,
however, because the district court did not sufficiently develop a record
regarding Islamorada’s justifications for its ordinance and the nondiscriminatory alternatives available.107
The Eleventh Circuit’s attempt to distinguish Exxon seems
inconsistent given that the statute in Exxon also completely prohibited
retailers sharing certain characteristics (retailers that produced and
refined gasoline). This inconsistency represents why the circuits split
when evaluating DCC challenges to laws affecting national chains.
2.

In Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, the Eleventh Circuit
Applied Elevated Scrutiny to an Ordinance Restricting “Formula
Retail” Establishments

A similar case in the Eleventh Circuit, Island Silver & Spice Inc. v.
Islamorada, closely tracks the reasoning in Cachia. 108 Island Silver &
Spice, Inc. (Island Silver) owned and operated an independent retail
store and wanted to sell property to a developer seeking to establish a
Walgreens. 109 Islamorada enacted a zoning ordinance that restricted the
construction of “formula retail” establishments, which were defined as:
[a] type of retail sales activity of retail sales
establishment . . . that is required by contractual or other
arrangement to maintain any of the following: standardized
array of services or merchandise, trademark, logo, service mark,
symbol, decor, architecture, layout, uniform, or similar
standardized feature.
The ordinance limited “formula retail” establishments to 2,000 square
feet floor area and street level business frontage of fifty feet or less.110
When Island Silver’s potential buyer learned that it would not be able to

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 843 (emphasis added).
Id. at 843–44.
Id.
Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 845.
Id.

17 - Walker.docx (Do Not Delete)

2016]

12/20/2016 1:20 PM

THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE “EFFECT”

1909

develop a Walgreens, it backed out of the sale. 111 Island Silver
challenged the ordinance on DCC grounds. 112
As in Cachia, the Eleventh Circuit’s opinion demonstrated the tension
between Hunt and Exxon. 113 The United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida concluded that the ordinance violated the
Commerce Clause under either the elevated scrutiny test or the Pike
balancing test, 114 but on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit focused exclusively
on the elevated scrutiny test (tier one). 115 The Eleventh Circuit
recognized that the restriction “effectively prevents the establishment of
new formula retail stores.” 116 The district court found it irrelevant that a
local chain store faces the same restrictions as a national chain because it
found no evidence that local chain stores use the standardized features
prohibited by the ordinance. 117 The district court also neglected to
mention Exxon. 118 The Eleventh Circuit, citing Exxon, observed that the
mere fact that a burden falls on out-of-state companies does not support
a conclusion of discriminatory effect. 119 However, with almost no
analysis, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the formula retail
provision, like the statute in Hunt, produced a discriminatory effect: by
restricting chain retailers, the ordinance has the “practical effect” of
discriminating against interstate commerce. 120 Thus, the Eleventh Circuit
subjected the ordinance to elevated scrutiny. 121
B.

Courts in the Ninth Circuit Privilege the Reasoning from Exxon

While the Eleventh Circuit’s approach privileges Hunt, the Ninth and
First Circuit privilege Exxon. In International Franchise Ass’n v. City of
Seattle (“IFA v. City of Seattle”), 122 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

111. Id. at 845.
112. Id. at 845–46.
113. Id. at 846–47.
114. Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1290 (S.D. Fl. 2007), aff’d,
542 F.3d 844 (11th Cir. 2008).
115. Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2008).
116. Id. (quoting Evidentiary Stipulation at 7, Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 475 F.
Supp. 2d 1281 (S.D. Fl. 2007) (No. 04-10097)).
117. Island Silver, 475 F. Supp. 2d at 1291.
118. Id. at 1281–94.
119. Island Silver, 542 F.3d at 846.
120. Id. at 847.
121. Id.
122. 803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016).
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considered a DCC challenge. 123 In remarking on a circuit split on this
area in the law, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City
of Turlock 124 as evidence of the Ninth Circuit’s approach, and to Wine &
Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island 125 as evidence of the First
Circuit’s approach. 126
1.

In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, a District Court in the
Ninth Circuit Did Not Apply Elevated Scrutiny to an Ordinance
Prohibiting “Discount Superstores”

Wal-Mart purchased the land for a prospective Supercenter, and
following lobbying by local retailers, the City of Turlock enacted an
ordinance that would undermine Wal-Mart’s plan. 127 The Turlock City
Council enacted a land use ordinance amending the City’s Zoning Code
to prohibit “Discount Superstores,” defined as follows:
a store that is similar to a “Discount Store” . . . with the
exception that [it] also contain[s] a full-service grocery
department under the same roof that shares entrances and exits
with the discount store area. Such retail stores exceed 100,000
square feet of gross floor area and devote at least five percent
(5%) of the total sales floor area to the sale of non-taxable
merchandise. . . . These stores usually offer a variety of
customer services, centralized cashing, and a wide range of
products. They typically maintain long store hours seven (7)
days a week. The stores are often the only ones on the site, but
they can also be found in mutual operation with a related or
unrelated garden center or service station. Discount superstores
are also sometimes found as separate parcels within a retail
complex with their own dedicated parking. 128

123. Id. at 397–98.
124. 483 F. Supp. 2d 987 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
125. 481 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007).
126. Island Silver, 803 F.3d at 404 n.7.
127. Wal-Mart Stores, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 994.
128. Id. at 991–92; Definition of “Discount Stores”:
[S]tores with off-street parking that usually offer a variety of customer services, centralized
cashing, and a wide range of products. [‘Discount Stores’] usually maintain long store hours
seven (7) days a week. The stores are often the only ones on the site, but they can also be found
in mutual operation with a related or unrelated garden center or service station. Discount stores
are also sometimes found as separate parcels within a retail complex with their own dedicated
parking.
Id. at 991.
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This ordinance prohibited the creation of a Wal-Mart Supercenter in the
City of Turlock. 129 In response, Wal-Mart challenged the ordinance on
DCC grounds. 130
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
presented a thorough argument on the subject of elevated scrutiny. The
district court explored three main points during this discussion.131 First,
the district court addressed Exxon. 132 The district court concluded that
the Turlock ordinance was analogous to the Maryland statute in Exxon
because the ordinance did not discriminate against interstate commerce;
it discriminated against a particular business structure that some
interstate businesses use. 133 The market remains “open to all local or
foreign retailers of all local or foreign products, except in the discount
superstore format.” 134 Noting that Wal-Mart relied upon Hunt, the
district court explained that “Exxon distinguished Hunt on the grounds
that, in Hunt, ‘the challenged state statute raised the cost of doing
business for out-of-state dealers’ in relation to those from within the
state.” 135 Because the plaintiffs provided no evidence that the Turlock
ordinance raised the cost of doing business in a similar manner, the
district court concluded that the ordinance was not discriminatory. 136
The second area of discussion that the district court highlighted was
the distinction between discriminatory intention and effect.137 The
district court noted that no Commerce Clause case it researched resulted
in the invalidation of a regulation for the legislators’ alleged
discriminatory motives alone. 138
With respect to the third area of discussion, the district court
evaluated Wal-Mart’s specific arguments of how practical effect
manifested in the instant case. 139 While Wal-Mart argued that the
ordinance discriminated only against out-of-state companies, the district
court disagreed because the ordinance prohibits both in-state and out-of-

129. Id. at 992.
130. Id. at 994.
131. Id. at 1011–17 (listing headings for “Exxon,” “Intention versus Effect,” and “Practical
Effect”).
132. Id. at 1011–12.
133. Id. at 1012.
134. Id.
135. Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1012–13.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 1013–17.
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state companies from establishing discount stores. 140 Wal-Mart also
argued that the ordinance had a disparate impact on out-of-state
companies, but the district court rejected this, noting that the Exxon
Court rejected a similar argument. 141
Another argument that Wal-Mart raised was that the ordinance
discriminated against goods in interstate commerce because Wal-Mart
Supercenters stock more out-of-state goods than other retail formats. 142
The district court explained, however, that the ordinance does not pertain
to out-of-state goods; it “does not limit WalMart’s choice of producers,
processors, or suppliers.” 143 Lastly, the district court addressed WalMart’s argument that the ordinance increased costs for out-of-state
operators. 144 The district court directed attention to the fact that WalMart could operate in other formats. 145 Therefore, the ordinance did not
necessarily increase costs for out-of-state operators. 146 As a result, the
court did not apply elevated scrutiny. 147
2.

In IFA v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Did Not Apply Elevated
Scrutiny to an Ordinance That Established a Faster Phase-In of
the Minimum Wage for Franchisees

A more recent case out of the Ninth Circuit, IFA v. City of Seattle,
demonstrated a similar reluctance to apply elevated scrutiny to laws
affecting national chains. 148 The Seattle City Council adopted a
minimum wage ordinance and established two different phase-in
schedules under the ordinance. 149 Under the ordinance, large businesses
have a faster phase-in, while smaller businesses have a slower phasein. 150 Importantly, the ordinance classified franchisees as large
employers, subjected to the faster phase-in of the minimum wage. 151 In
response to this ordinance, the International Franchise Association (IFA)

140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1014.
Id.
Id. at 1015.
Id. at 1016.
Id. 1016–17.
Id. at 1017.
Id. at 1016–17.
Id. at 1017.
803 F.3d 389 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016).
Id. at 397–98.
Id.
Id. at 398.
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sued the City of Seattle, “seeking a preliminary injunction that would
require Seattle to classify certain franchisees as small employers.” 152
IFA alleged that the ordinance violated the DCC. 153
The district court denied IFA’s motion for a preliminary injunction,
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals merely reviewed this denial for
abuse of discretion, while reviewing “the underlying legal principles de
novo.” 154 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not
abuse its discretion, nor did it employ an improper legal standard. 155 IFA
argued that the increased labor costs for the franchisees “rigg[ed] the
playing field,” 156 as occurred in Hunt and the Eleventh Circuit cases, but
the district court faulted IFA for failing to present any hard evidence on
this point. 157 In determining whether the ordinance produced any
discriminatory effects, the district court evaluated several criteria:
including the “mix of goods test,” presence of competitive
disadvantages, increased costs creating barriers to entry, and raised labor
costs that would impact interstate commerce.158 Ultimately, the district
court concluded “that there [was] no evidence demonstrating whether
the Ordinance [would] have an impact on interstate commerce.” 159 Upon
review, the Ninth Circuit remarked that “[w]e lack Supreme Court
authority assessing whether a regulation affecting franchises ipso facto
has the effect of discriminating against interstate commerce.” 160 The
Ninth Circuit observed that the ordinance appeared to burden only instate franchisees, “not the wheels of interstate commerce” itself. 161
3.

In Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, the First
Circuit Did Not Apply Elevated Scrutiny to a Statute Prohibiting
Franchise Liquor Stores

In IFA v. City of Seattle, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that
the First Circuit’s approach to DCC challenges diverged from the
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 405–07.
156. IFA v. City of Seattle, 97 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1275–76 (W.D. Wash. 2015), aff’d, 803 F.3d
389 (9th Cir. 2015).
157. Id.
158. IFA, 803 F.3d at 405.
159. IFA, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 1276.
160. IFA, 803 F.3d at 404 (“Nor has the Supreme Court addressed whether franchises are
instrumentalities of interstate commerce that cannot be subjected to disparate regulatory burdens.”).
161. Id. at 406.
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Eleventh Circuit’s approach with respect to laws affecting national
chains. 162 The Ninth Circuit cited Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode
Island as evidence of this split. 163
Since 1933, “Rhode Island had barred chain-store organizations from
holding Class A liquor licenses,” and Rhode Island later expanded that
prohibition by more specifically defining chain-stores to include
franchise-type arrangements. 164 Rhode Island’s legislation effectively
prohibited chain-stores and franchises from engaging in the retail sale of
alcoholic beverages. Moreover, in determining whether an entity is a
chain-store organization, the statute included in the definition “chains in
which one or more stores are located outside of the state.” 165 In response,
a liquor franchisor challenged the statute on DCC grounds, contending
that the statute produced a discriminatory effect.166
The First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s
determination that the statute had no such effect. 167 The First Circuit
explained that the plaintiffs have the burden of persuasion and plaintiffs
produced no evidence of discriminatory effect: “There is, for example,
no evidence of any carve-out or other device that would enable in-state
entities to evade the challenged restrictions, nor is there any hint of a
home-field advantage in connection with the State’s enforcement of the
restrictions. The absence of any such evidence is telling.” 168 Unlike the
Eleventh Circuit, which viewed prohibition of franchises, in and of
itself, as evidence of discriminatory effect, the First Circuit required
evidence supporting the notion that this prohibition truly discriminated
against interstate commerce. 169 The First Circuit’s more searching
standard for discriminatory effect aligns with the Ninth Circuit’s
approach.

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Id. at 404 n.7.
Id.
Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2007).
Id. at 12 (quoting R.I. GEN. LAWS § 3-5-11(a)).
Id. at 10.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14–15.
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III. THE REASON FOR THE SPLIT AND PROPOSED
RESOLUTIONS
A.

The First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits Adopted Two Different
Approaches to Regulations Restricting Chains Because of Different
Concerns and Different Interpretations of Exxon and Hunt.

There are two factors driving this split between the circuits. First, the
Eleventh Circuit concluded that the prohibition of interstate chains was
especially problematic, 170 whereas the Ninth and First Circuits have not
expressed this same concern.
Second, these circuits adopted different approaches because they
disagree about how to interpret Hunt and Exxon. This confusion is
inevitable given the Supreme Court’s inconsistent jurisprudence. There
are several possible solutions to this confusion, and all of them require
the Supreme Court to clarify this muddled area of the law.
1.

The Eleventh Circuit Is More Concerned with the Prohibitive
Nature of Regulations

The Eleventh Circuit applied elevated scrutiny because it was
concerned with Islamorada’s ability to prohibit formula restaurants and
to effectively prohibit formula retail establishments. 171 The Eleventh
Circuit’s holding in Cachia states that the elevated scrutiny test applied
“because the ordinance’s complete prohibition of chain restaurants
sharing certain characteristics disproportionately targeted restaurants
operating in interstate commerce.” 172 The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning
for applying elevated scrutiny in Island Silver also focused on the
complete prohibition of interstate chains. 173
Faced with distinguishing the Exxon case, the Eleventh Circuit
concluded in Cachia that such a prohibition on interstate chains amounts
to more than the “regulation of methods of operation” at stake in

170. See Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2008) (“the ordinance’s complete
prohibition of chain restaurants sharing certain characteristics amounts to more than the regulation
of methods of operation . . . .).
171. Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 847–48 (11th Cir. 2008). The
regulation effectively prohibited formula retail establishments because the size requirements could
not accommodate nationally and regionally branded formula retail stores. Id. at 846.
172. Cachia, 542 F.3d at 839.
173. Island Silver, 542 F.3d at 846–47 (“[T]he ordinance’s effective elimination of all new
interstate chain retailers has the ‘practical effect of . . . discriminating against’ interstate commerce.”
(quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350 (1977)).
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Exxon. 174 Similarly, in Island Silver the Eleventh Circuit cited Exxon
without actually distinguishing it.175 The Eleventh Circuit cited Exxon
for the following proposition: “the fact that the burden of a regulation
falls onto a subset of out-state-interests ‘does not, by itself, establish a
claim of discrimination . . . .’” 176 Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit
summarily concluded that the prohibition of chains was subject to
elevated scrutiny. 177
It makes little sense for the Eleventh Circuit to emphasize prohibition
as a means of distinguishing Exxon because Exxon involved its own sort
of prohibition; the statute at issue in Exxon prohibited producers or
refiners of petroleum products from operating retail service stations in
Maryland. 178 Because all of the producers and refiners were out-of-state
companies, this statute shielded in-state retail stations. 179 The Eleventh
Circuit does not address this discrepancy.
The lack of depth on this point is probably due to the Eleventh
Circuit’s reliance on Hunt. The Eleventh Circuit explained that the Hunt
Court found discriminatory effect where a regulation raised the cost of
doing business in one state market for an out-of-state dealer. 180 The
Eleventh Circuit further explained that the Exxon Court distinguished
Hunt as a case where in-state companies had a competitive advantage
over out-of-state companies. 181 The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that
prohibiting one type of business is more discriminatory than raising the
costs of that business and doing so results in a competitive advantage for
in-state companies. 182
While the Eleventh Circuit found the prohibition of chains
discriminatory, the Wal-Mart district court and First Circuit were less

174. Cachia, 542 F.3d at 843.
175. Island Silver, 542 F.3d at 846–47.
176. Id. at 846 (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978)).
177. Id. at 846–47. In Island Silver, the Eleventh Circuit only spent one paragraph (206 words) on
its conclusion that that the formula retail provision should be subject to elevated scrutiny. Id.
Compare this limited discussion of whether first-tier scrutiny applies with the lengthy discussions in
Wal-Mart, IFA, and Wine Retailers.
178. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 148 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(“Here, the statute bans the refiners and producers from the retail market altogether . . . .”).
179. See supra notes 70–72 and accompanying text.
180. Cachia, 542 F.3d at 842.
181. Id. at 843.
182. Id. at 842. (“In the instant case, the ordinance’s formula retail provision does not simply
raise the costs of operating a formula restaurant in Islamorada, but entirely prohibits such
restaurants from opening.”)
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concerned with such prohibitions. 183 The Wal-Mart case is analogous to
the Island Silver case because the regulation applied to both local and
out-of-state stores, but no local stores used this business structure. 184 The
Island Silver court thought that this effective elimination of new chain
retailers warranted elevated scrutiny. 185 The Wal-Mart district court, on
the other hand, concluded that the neutral application of the regulation
cut against elevated scrutiny; the court reiterated the following principle
from Exxon: the DCC does not protect retail formats. 186 Thus, the WalMart district court’s reasoning reflects its assumption that Exxon dealt
with a regulatory structure just as prohibitory as the regulations at issue.
Because those prohibitions were neutral and based on business
operations, the Wal-Mart district court found no discriminatory effect. 187
As for the First Circuit, it was similarly unconcerned with the
“prohibition on franchise and chain-store arrangements.” 188 The First
Circuit concentrated on the language in Exxon stating “that a state
regulation that burdens some interstate firms ‘does not, by itself,
establish a claim of discrimination against interstate commerce.’” 189 The
First Circuit concluded the regulation did not produce a discriminatory
effect because the plaintiffs had insufficient evidence of
discrimination. 190
These cases from the First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits illustrate that
one of the factors driving the circuit split is what sort of significance the
prohibitory nature of a regulation should have for the DCC analysis. The
First and Ninth Circuit cases demonstrate a lack of concern about the
prohibitory regulation of franchises. Meanwhile, the Eleventh Circuit
cases show a much stronger concern about these sorts of regulations.

183. The city in IFA regulated rather than prohibited franchises. IFA v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d
389, 397–98 (9th Cir. 2015) (regulation concerned increasing the minimum wage), cert. denied,
__ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016).
184. See Island Silver & Spice, Inc. v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 844, 846 (11th Cir. 2008); Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1012, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 2006).
185. Island Silver, 542 F.3d at 846–47.
186. Wal-Mart Stores, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1014 (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S.
117, 127 (1978)).
187. Id. at 1013–14.
188. Wine and Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2007).
189. Id. at 14–15.
190. Id.
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The First, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits Disagree Regarding How
to Interpret Exxon and Hunt

The second cause of the circuit split relates to the tension between
Exxon and Hunt and each Court’s decision regarding which of the two
precedents to privilege. Recall that the Exxon Court identified three
barriers absent from Exxon but present in other discriminatory effects
cases such as Hunt: restricting the flow of goods, adding costs for outof-state dealers, and distinguishing between in-state and out-of-state
companies in the retail market. 191 The last two barriers are discussed by
courts in the Eleventh and Ninth Circuits. The First Circuit did not
discuss these barriers and instead focused on similarities to Exxon. The
underlying irreconcilability of Exxon and Hunt plagues each of these
approaches.
a.

The Eleventh Circuit’s Explanation of How Exxon Distinguished
Hunt Demonstrates the Difficulty in Distinguishing These Two
Cases

The Eleventh Circuit explained that Exxon distinguished Hunt on the
basis that Exxon did not involve in-state companies having a competitive
advantage over out-of-state companies, whereas Hunt did involve this
in-state advantage. 192 The problem with this approach is that the Exxon
Court was referring to the lack of competitive advantage between instate independent dealers and out-of-state independent dealers. 193 Putting
this in terms of the Cachia and Island Silver cases, there would be no
competitive advantage between local non-formula businesses and out-ofstate non-formula businesses. Thus, the Exxon Court’s flawed attempt to
distinguish Hunt has led the Eleventh Circuit to follow the same
confusing path. A major source of the confusion is the vague way in
which the Exxon Court states “in-state independent dealers will have no
competitive advantage over out-of-state dealers.” 194 The Exxon Court
should have compared independent in-state dealers with independent
out-of-state dealers. And the Exxon Court should have stated “in-state
191. See supra sections I.C.2–3.
192. Cachia v. Islamorada, 542 F.3d 839, 843 (11th Cir. 2008) (“Exxon found that, where in-state
companies would ‘have no competitive advantage over out-of-state [companies],’ the elevated
scrutiny approach used in Hunt did not apply.”). This distinguishing corresponds with the third
barrier described in Exxon. See supra sections I.C.2–3.
193. Independent dealers are retailer dealers that do not operate as refiners or producers of oil.
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 126 (1978).
194. Id.
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independent dealers will have no competitive advantage over out-ofstate independent dealers.” 195 This statement would be more accurate,
but it would also demonstrate the difficulty in distinguishing Hunt
because that statement applies to Hunt as well; the Hunt statute provided
no competitive advantage for in-state grade-complying apple sellers over
out-of-state grade-complying apple sellers. 196
b.

The Ninth Circuit’s Explanation of How Exxon Distinguished Hunt
Also Demonstrates the Difficulty in Distinguishing These Two
Cases

The Wal-Mart district court in the Ninth Circuit explained that Exxon
distinguished Hunt on the grounds that, in Hunt, “‘the challenged state
statute raised the cost of doing business for out-of-state dealers’ in
relation to those from within the state, and ‘in various other ways,
favored the in-state dealer in the local market.’” 197 The Wal-Mart district
court found that the ordinance was more analogous to Exxon than Hunt
because Wal-Mart provided no evidence that doing business in a nondiscount superstore format costs more than doing business in a different
format. 198 It seems that the Wal-Mart district court started by looking at
the alleged increased costs to the out-of-state dealers as opposed to the
benefit to the in-state dealers. Finding no increased costs, it concluded
that there was no discriminatory effect.199
The problem with Exxon’s distinguishing of Hunt is that the
challenged statute in Hunt did not actually raise the cost of doing
business for all out-of-state dealers; the law only hurt a segment of outof-state business, and the law applied to local businesses, just as the
Exxon law did. 200 Moreover, the costs that those out-of-state businesses
would face appear even higher in Exxon. Prohibiting a given out-of-state
dealer from using a particular grade to mark fruit seems less burdensome
than prohibiting a given out-of-state dealer from being a producer and
refiner of oil. The former condition, as seen in Hunt, raised the costs of
195. See id.
196. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 337 (1977) (the statute
regulated the grading system and did not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state sellers).
197. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Turlock, 483 F. Supp. 2d 987, 1012 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (citing
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126). This distinguishing corresponds with the second barrier discussed in
Exxon. See supra sections I.C.2–3.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1017.
200. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 146–47 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also
Denning, supra note 19, at 466.

17 - Walker.docx (Do Not Delete)

1920

12/20/2016 1:20 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1895

out-of-state dealers that wanted to sell fruit using a particular grade.201
The latter condition, as seen in Exxon, would require that out-of-state
business give up an entire separate business: the refining and production
of oil. 202
Analogizing this to the Wal-Mart case, the challenged regulation only
hurt a segment of out-of-state business, 203 just like the regulations in
Exxon and Hunt. Given that Exxon and Hunt are not as different as the
Supreme Court states, it is difficult to discern how the Wal-Mart court
should have applied this precedent.
As for the Ninth Circuit’s IFA case, the regulation there was not
prohibitory in nature, but the case indicates how the Ninth Circuit
engages in a DCC analysis of franchises generally. The court looked
more broadly at the very principle of drawing a distinction between
franchises and non-franchises. It noted that there was insufficient
evidence to demonstrate that franchises “are so interstate in character
relative to non-franchises” such that distinctions between them would
constitute interference with interstate commerce. 204 The court ultimately
concluded that there was no discriminatory effect because “in-state
franchisees are burdened, not the wheels of interstate commerce.” 205
This reflects Exxon’s proposition that a burden on some interstate firms
“does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination against interstate
commerce.” 206 There is something essentially different about burdening
individual firms and burdening interstate commerce, but the Ninth
Circuit did not elaborate on that difference.
c.

The First Circuit’s Approach Focused on Exxon

Compared to the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, the First Circuit did not
delve as deeply into the issue of what constitutes burden. The First
201. See Hunt, 432 U.S. at 351 (explaining that the statute raised “the costs of doing business in
the North Carolina market for Washington apple growers and dealers, while leaving those of their
North Carolina counterparts unaffected.”).
202. See Exxon, 437 U.S. at 119 (The statute provided “that a producer or refiner of petroleum
products . . . may not operate any retail service station within the State . . . .).
203. The regulation in Wal-Mart prohibited those out-of-state businesses that chose to operate in
a “Discount Superstore,” format; the regulation applied to both in-state and out-of-state businesses.
Wal-Mart, 483 F. Supp. 2d at 1012.
204. IFA v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 402 (9th Cir. 2015) (“IFA failed to demonstrate that
Seattle franchisees are out-of-state entities or that franchises are so interstate in character relative to
non-franchises that a distinction drawn on this basis interferes with interstate commerce.”), cert.
denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 1838 (2016).
205. Id. at 406.
206. Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126.
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Circuit heavily relied on Exxon for the proposition that a burden on some
interstate firms “does not, by itself, establish a claim of discrimination
against interstate commerce.” 207 The First Circuit also relied on Exxon’s
statement that the DCC does not protect particular business structures or
methods of operation. 208 Because the First Circuit never addressed the
arguments in Hunt, it did not fall into the trap of trying to reconcile the
two cases.
B.

What to Do: Solutions and Moving Forward

There are a few possible solutions that the Supreme Court could
undertake to clarify this muddled area of the law. Some of these
solutions are more viable than others. First, the Court could eliminate the
DCC’s first tier of scrutiny in its entirety. Second, the Court could carve
out a special exception for franchises, rendering DCC first tier scrutiny
unnecessary. Third, the Court could clarify Hunt and Exxon, either by
overruling or re-interpreting one or both of the cases.
1.

Eliminate the First Tier of Scrutiny

One solution is to eliminate the DCC’s first tier of scrutiny. 209 Much
of the confusion surrounding this circuit split on the DCC’s application
goes to the failings of the first tier. By eliminating this tier of scrutiny,
courts could avoid the question of whether a regulation is
“discriminatory,” and thereby avoid the question of whether a regulation
constitutes facial discrimination, discriminatory purpose, or
discriminatory effect. Instead of analyzing cases with so-called
discriminatory effect under the first tier, the Supreme Court could
analyze all such cases under the second tier, using the balancing test. If
the alleged discriminatory effects are harmful, then this deferential
standard should not overly encumber courts. 210
207. Wine & Spirits Retailers, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 481 F.3d 1, 14–15 (1st Cir. 2007) (quoting
Exxon, 437 U.S. at 126).
208. Id. at 15–16.
209. An alternative solution would be to eliminate the DCC doctrine altogether. Justices Antonin
Scalia and Clarence Thomas had long advocated for the court to reject this doctrine, and Justice
Scalia recently referred to the DCC as a “judicial fraud.” Comptroller of the Treasury of Md. v.
Wynee, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1787, 1806 (2015). While this cutting of the Gordian knot may be
tempting, this Note explores tensions implicated by one prong of one tier of the DCC analysis, so
discussion of the elimination of the entire DCC is beyond its scope.
210. See Kassel v. Consol. Freightway, 450 U.S. 662, 678–79 (1981) (applying balancing test and
invalidating state law where the slight benefit to the state was outweighed by the federal interest in
promoting commerce).
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For example, if the Court analyzed Hunt under the second tier, the
statute still might have been invalidated. Recall, the second tier
considers whether the State’s interest is legitimate and whether the
burden on interstate commerce clearly exceeds the local benefits.211
While states have a legitimate interest in “protecting their citizens from
confusion and deception in the marketing of foodstuffs,” 212 the Hunt
statute provided few local benefits. The statute permitted marketing
apples under the USDA grades or no grades at all, but it prohibited
marketing apples using grades that were superior to their USDA
counterparts. 213 Hunt is certainly a close case, but it could be invalidated
under the second tier given the minimal local benefits and high burden.
There is a risk that by relying only upon second tier scrutiny, the
courts may uphold some protectionist measures. The second tier of
scrutiny is more deferential than the first tier.214 Eliminating the first tier
would communicate that the second tier acts as a sufficient barrier to
protectionist regulations. The extent to which the second tier provides
sufficient protection depends upon how concerned one is about the
dangers of protectionist measures. Ultimately, it is difficult to judge how
effectively the second tier invalidates protectionist measures because
“‘there is no clear line’ separating the categories identified in its [DCC]
taxonomy.” 215 If this is the case, then eliminating one tier creates little
increase in the risk of protectionist regulations surviving the DCC
analysis.
2.

Carve Out an Exception for Franchises

Another solution is to create a special exception for franchises. The
Ninth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court had not addressed “whether
franchises are instrumentalities of interstate commerce that cannot be
subjected to disparate regulatory burdens.” 216 The Supreme Court could
conclude that a franchise is akin to an interstate road—that it constitutes
an instrumentality of interstate commerce. 217
211. See supra section I.B.
212. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 353 (1977).
213. Id. at 336–37.
214. See supra section I.B.
215. Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 6 (quoting Brown Foreman-Distillers Corp. v.
N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986)).
216. IFA v. City of Seattle, 803 F.3d 389, 404 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 136 S. Ct.
1838 (2016).
217. See Alstate Const. Co. v. Durkin, 345 U.S. 13, 16 (1953) (referring to precedent stating that
“interstate roads and railroads are indispensable ‘instrumentalities’ in the carriage of persons and
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This seems like an unlikely path for the Court to take because a
particular franchise store or restaurant does not necessarily serve to
connect goods and persons across state lines; some franchises may use
goods from other states or employ people from out-of-state, but so do
non-franchise operations. Moreover, establishing a special carve out for
franchises would resolve the application of the DCC to franchises, but it
would fail to resolve the underlying tension between Exxon and Hunt.
3.

Overrule or Re-interpret Exxon or Hunt

If the Supreme Court chooses to retain first tier analysis of
discriminatory effect claims and to apply it to franchises, then the Court
must clarify whether to follow the Exxon or Hunt approach going
forward. The Supreme Court could overrule Exxon or Hunt to the extent
that one does not align with the other. Exxon and Hunt are inconsistent
because the Hunt Court found discriminatory effect where a state
regulation burdened some interstate firms, 218 and the Exxon Court
concluded that this, by itself, did not establish a claim of discrimination
against interstate commerce. 219
The question is: what did the Hunt Court find to bolster its conclusion
that the regulation at issue produced a discriminatory effect? The
Supreme Court puts forward three differences between the regulation in
Exxon versus a regulation such as the one in Hunt: “it does not prohibit
the flow of interstate goods, place added costs upon them, or distinguish
between in-state and out-of-state companies in the retail market.” 220 As
previously discussed, 221 these differences are not so obvious, and they
arguably do not distinguish the two cases much at all. Ultimately, the
decision as to whether Exxon or Hunt was wrongly decided will depend
upon the degree to which the Court is concerned about the dangers of
protectionism.

goods that move in interstate commerce”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 776.29 (2016) (“Instrumentalities
and channels which serve as the media for the movement of goods and persons in interstate
commerce or for interstate communications include railroads, highways, city streets; telephone, gas,
electric and pipe line systems; radio and television broadcasting facilities; rivers, canals and other
waterways; airports; railroad, bus, truck or steamship terminals; freight depots, bridges, ferries,
bays, harbors, docks, wharves, piers; ships, vehicles and aircraft which are regularly used in
interstate commerce.”).
218. See Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333, 350–51 (1977).
219. See Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 125–28 (1978).
220. Id. at 126.
221. See supra section I.C.
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One solution less drastic than overruling Exxon or Hunt would be to
simply re-interpret, or re-read, one of the cases. For example, in
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 222 the Supreme Court
characterized Hunt as having been decided on evidence of
discriminatory purpose rather than discriminatory effect. 223 If courts
accept this interpretation of Hunt, or if the Supreme Court explicitly
endorses this interpretation, then perhaps the Eleventh Circuit should
reverse course and turn to Exxon for guidance on finding discriminatory
effect. Alternatively, the Supreme Court could re-interpret Exxon so as
to cabin it to its facts. The Supreme Court could explain that the alleged
discrimination in Exxon was not significant enough to warrant first tier
treatment.
1. There Are Advantages and Disadvantages to the Three Solutions
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages.
Eliminating the first tier of scrutiny, the first approach, has the
advantage of making a clean break from the murky jurisprudence
surrounding the differences between facial discrimination,
discriminatory intent, and discriminatory effect. On the other hand,
eliminating the first tier of scrutiny would leave potentially
discriminatory regulations subject only to a balancing test. As a result,
more protectionist regulations might slip through the cracks. 224 Turning
to the second approach, a carve out for franchises has the advantage of
creating a clear rule for DCC challenges in franchise cases; however,
this approach fails to address the tension between Exxon and Hunt that
produced the circuit split. The third approach, overruling or reinterpreting Exxon and Hunt, tasks the Supreme Court with resolving
this underlying tension between Exxon and Hunt, either by overruling or
re-interpreting one of the cases. Given the Supreme Court’s general
adherence to the “rule of stare decisis,” 225 re-interpretation seems more
likely. As to which case the Supreme Court should re-interpret, that is
beyond the scope of this Note. Privileging Exxon would make
discriminatory effect claims more difficult to win, and privileging Hunt
would have the opposite effect.

222.
223.
224.
225.

449 U.S. 456 (1981).
Baker & Konar-Steenberg, supra note 32, at 7.
See supra notes 30–41 and accompanying text.
See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992) (emphasis omitted).
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CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this Note calls for the Supreme Court to consider this
DCC issue and resolve the split. The irreconcilability of Hunt and Exxon
has led to divergent approaches to the regulation of franchises. The
Court’s lackluster attempt to distinguish Hunt and Exxon has lured some
circuits down a convoluted path; the Court should provide the clear
direction that judges, cities, and franchisees need.

